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Abstract 
Interest groups have played an important if unappreciated role in shaping intellectual property rights. 
As economies are driven by ideas, rather than manufactured goods, there is likely to be a 
reconfiguration of the incentives granted and withheld from innovators. The paper argues that prizes 
(rather than intellectual property rights) – including grants, subsidies, and various contractual promises 
– will increase in importance. The discussion includes prizes as substitutes for both patents and 
copyrights, and suggests that industries as diverse as pharmaceuticals and newsgathering are likely 
fields for an "iPrize Revolution." The change is the product of interest group forces and not necessarily 
efficient. 
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 1 
Intellectual property law is apt to change as economies evolve. Interest groups and other forces have 
brought about an expansion of property rights over the last century or two, and in similar fashion they 
can be expected to bring about other changes in economies now dominated by ideas rather than 
manufactured goods. In particular we can expect prizes—including grants, subsidies, and various 
contractual promises—to be more attractive than property rights as the means of encouraging 
innovation. The predicted move toward prizes of all kinds is not necessarily efficient or wise, as 
various interest groups and other considerations may play too strong a role in legal change.  
Introduction 
Advanced modern economies depend more on ideas than on manufactured goods. My argument in this 
paper begins with the notion that the forces that brought about an expansion of property rights, and 
especially intellectual property rights, weaken as an economy is dominated by services and ideas. As 
the market share or importance of ideas grows, there is more pressure on the traditional distinction in 
patent law between “devices,” which gain protection under the law, and “ideas,” which do not. I argue 
that interest groups will favor “prizes,” by which I mean a variety of direct inducements to innovators, 
over property rights. The move from property rights to prizes has already begun, but this iPrize 
Revolution, as we might call it, is likely to gain power. The discussion begins to grapple with the 
question of whether the revolution is to be welcomed.  
I. Do Things or Ideas Require More Protection? 
A. The Idea-Device Distinction 
Every student of intellectual property knows that ideas are generally available to everyone who comes 
across them. These valuable assets are in the commons and, absent specific protection, are not easily 
brought into the domain of private property. Albert Einstein could not have patented , and 
patents are similarly unavailable to one who discovers a natural cure, however much effort or “sweat 
of the brow,” as it is called in intellectual property circles, might have gone into these discoveries.1 
This limitation regarding patent eligibility extends to copyright law. If the scientist who discovers a 
natural cure writes a book about the cure she discovered, the copyright monopoly available to her 
covers only the expression of the idea. Once published, the cure itself will be available to all readers 
without charge. In patent law, the requirement of a machine, a process tied to a machine, an article of 
manufacture, or a composition of matter—but in any event of something more than an abstract idea or 
law of nature—generates an idea-device distinction. Similarly, copyright law can be described as 
reflecting an idea-expression distinction. In both areas of law, an abstract idea, standing alone, is 
unprotected. 
An innovator or great thinker can try to work around this limitation. If the scientist who discovered 
the natural cure identified an herb with great medicinal powers, for instance, and were politically well 
connected, or lived in medieval times, a sympathetic or opportunistic patron might have arranged for 
an exclusive import license or simply a ban on competitors’ trading in the herb. Indeed, English and 
other law doled out “patents,” for such things as salt, but these patents were essentially licenses, and 
either revenue-raisers or strategic favors. In addition, they could be—and sometimes were—terminated 
without compensation. Some might have had the effect of encouraging other scientists to develop 
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 U.S. law is among the most generous when it comes to patent eligibility, and the distinction sketched here is indeed 
universal. There are obvious exceptions, such as the protection of fashion designs in Europe or hull designs in the United 
States, but these can usually be ascribed to interest group pressure, as if in confirmation of the central focus of this paper. 
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ideas that could lead to state grants of monopolies on items that their ideas identified as valuable.
2
 But 
few ideas are easily linked to imports or other things that can be monopolized. Moreover, when there 
is a monopoly to be exploited, the state need not grant it. Even the most grateful government could 
probably not have turned Einstein’s famous equation into a property right, or monopoly, for his 
benefit. A great thinker and innovator must hope to benefit from an improved reputation, from a first-
mover advantage in a market where the idea can be applied, from a tenured position at a university, or 
from some other, secondary incentive.  
But why the idea-device distinction, and might it be obsolete? Concreteness is central to patent 
eligibility, as is fixation (and expression) to copyright, but it is not clear why this is so. Conventional 
explanations for the idea-expression distinction in copyright are plentiful, and can inform the idea-
device distinction. All appeal to the intuition that there must be some balance between rewarding 
novelty and enabling innovators to stand on the shoulders of their predecessors, without suggesting 
how we might find the correct balance. 
An easy explanation for the idea-device distinction, especially where abstract ideas are concerned, 
is that concreteness facilitates enforcement. Another is that geniuses, or even educated citizens with 
lively imaginations, can be counted on to generate ideas even in the absence of rewards; fertile minds 
may be irrepressible and require little encouragement. Third, and perhaps most convincingly is the 
intuition that while all incentives for innovation in the form of monopoly grants threaten subsequent 
innovation—except to the extent that they encourage the disclosure of innovations and thus help 
subsequent innovators—the tradeoff is more favorable where concrete applications rather than abstract 
ideas are concerned.  
Yet another explanation for the idea-device distinction brushes up against the historical or 
evolutionary question of how and why societies developed intellectual property rights, if not all 
property rights. As it turns out, both the leading explanation and its iconoclastic rival require some 
evolutionary move, or legal transition, in which intellectual property rights attached to innovations 
while pre-existing ideas, on which these innovations drew, were left in the commons. If a legal system 
announces that new inventions are recognized as private property, through the grant of a monopoly or 
other means, there is the immediate question of the treatment of previous inventions. The requirement 
of novelty is one way to overcome this transition problem when starting a new legal regime; it 
promises rewards to innovators going forward without giving windfalls to those who produced 
inventions that are already known. But there remains the problem that virtually every innovation 
exploits earlier ideas. A convenient means of solving this transition problem, especially when it is 
difficult to register and date new ideas, is to do everything possible to set aside pure, or abstract, ideas.  
It is likely that there are circumstances in which the grant of property rights does more harm than 
good, and that the idea-device distinction is a means of withholding property rights where this is so. 
Thus, it is well knows that patents can block innovation, and we might expect predictable blockers to 
be labeled as ideas, and in this way disabled by their patent ineligibility. There is something of an 
historical pattern. There was an early phase of economic development, in which our ancestors 
developed things like the wheel and the alphabet. Had property rights attached, it is likely that 
economic progress would have been stifled. There was a middle period where intellectual property 
rights, ranging from political rewards (like a viceroyship for one who discovers a new colony) to 
various monopoly assignments, including patents and copyrights, seem to have worked well. Perhaps 
this was so because concrete applications required capital investments, or perhaps interest groups 
simply protected their investments, or entered into partnerships with governments. We do not need to 
be sure about the origin of property rights in order to advance the conjecture that the rules that worked 
well for two hundred years might not be those that will triumph in the next two hundred. There is no 
                                                     
2
 E. Wyndham Hulme, The History of the Patent System under the Prerogative and at Common Law, 12 L. Q. Rev. 141, 
143, 148-9 (1896) (noting English patents issued in 1440 for a method of manufacturing salt, in 1565 to an artisan for 
making “white salt,” and again in 1566 for “the making of salt”). 
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reason to be sure that an “advanced” age, with very low information and transaction costs, requires the 
same property rights as The Industrial Revolution. On the other hand, our legal system makes it 
difficult to change the rules.  
B. Contrasting Intuitions about Property Rights in the Idea Economy 
What should be expected of property rights in an era when ideas rather than devices dominate the 
landscape? The related, prescriptive question asks how the legal system ought to encourage innovation 
in an age of ideas.  
The argument for expanding property rights to include ideas need not apologize for the idea-device 
distinction, but could simply build on the strong intuition that secure property rights encourage 
owners. It might even be combined with the unsettling perspective that describes property rights as the 
product of interest-group activity, rather than as the handmaiden of efficiency.
3
 Under this iconoclastic 
view, interest groups champion the development of private property rights when they can benefit from 
these rights; the beneficiaries of a commons are normally dispersed and without influence. It is 
plausible, for example, that the distinction between devices and mere ideas in patent law developed 
because manufacturers supported a patent system in order to protect monopolies in various products, 
but then resisted protections for abstract ideas because these were the very innovations developed by 
workers or outsiders who had little in the way of physical capital but who could contribute 
improvements to benefit the manufacturing process. In any event, under this view current property 
rights arrangements require some defending, but at least there is no reason to rely on the evolution of 
legal rights as a reason not to provide property right protection for mere ideas.  
C. Maintaining the Idea-Device Distinction 
The opposing intuition is more respectful of the idea-device distinction. If there is genius behind this 
distinction, and its origins or maintenance cannot be attributed to the dark side of interest group 
politics, then it almost follows that an economy dominated by ideas is one that has little need for 
intellectual property rights. This perspective suggests that legislative or judicial steps to expand 
intellectual property rights in an idea-intensive era should be viewed skeptically. As the fraction of 
ideas to all innovations grows, it is likely that interest groups eager to push for expanded intellectual 
property rights will gain influence. Following this view, the pressure for expanded property rights is 
not much different from the push for protective tariffs or railroad monopolies in the U.S. and 
elsewhere in the 1800s. 
A canonical observation about interest groups is that they are more likely to organize and to be 
effective when threatened with a loss. The notion is not only one of an endowment effect, but also that 
potential losers are identifiable, while potential winners are normally dispersed and less identifiable. 
As such, a contraction of property rights will likely arouse interest group opposition more than would 
an expansion be fueled by support. There is also the skeptical view of law and of the two competing 
stories of the evolution of property rights; powerful interests manage to be endowed with property 
rights, and it is simply difficult to unseat such interests. 
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 The theory includes the notion that governments might advance property rights, in coordination with interest groups, if 
these serve its purposes, including the collection of tax revenues. See Saul Levmore, Two Stories about the Evolution of 
Property Rights, 31 J. Legal Stud. 421 (2002); Saul Levmore, Property’s Uneasy Path and Expanding Future, 70 U. Chi. 
L. Rev. 181 (2003). 
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D. Normative and Positive Conclusions 
As a positive matter, reasonable people could surely disagree as to how best to describe the evolution 
of property rights. We have come to associate secure rights with private investment, but we also 
associate royal grants and licenses with the development and assignment of property rights by 
governments—which benefit from some arrangements of rights. In short, there is an optimistic view of 
the evolution of property rights, but there is also a skeptical one. It is plausible that the truth involves 
some mixture of these views and, in any event, there is no reason why one view must be correct for all 
property rights. 
The normative debate is yet more complicated. Anyone who believes in a strong connection 
between property rights and growth, and thus argues for an expansion of intellectual property rights in 
the idea economy, must be tempted to argue that in the ancient age of ideas, when such things as the 
wheel and the alphabet were developed, progress would have been faster if property rights had been 
available. The contrary view, of course, is that these developments might well have been stifled with 
secure rights, because transaction costs would have interfered with the process of improvement in 
which thousands of innovators contributed to the development of these things over the course of many 
years. 
For present purposes it is useful to understand these perspectives but it is unnecessary to decide 
between them. If the iPrize Revolution, discussed presently in Part II, comes about the because of 
interest-group activity, as the skeptical view of legal evolution holds, it might nevertheless be 
beneficial. Indeed, if property rights emerged because of interest groups, it is troubling that these 
rights support monopolies and generate deadweight loss, and likely something of a relief to find that 
they might be supplanted by payments which are less likely to bring on the costs of monopoly. And 
even if the revolution is not to be celebrated, it will need to be understood.  
II. The iPrize Revolution 
A. Prizes and other Non-Monopolistic Incentives 
Patents and copyrights create monopolies, and thus come with well-known costs. They may encourage 
innovation, but they do so at the cost of monopolization and the deadweight loss accompanying it. 
There is a way to encourage ideas, if not all innovation, without creating monopolies and without 
blocking subsequent innovations. I refer, of course, to subsidies. Promised payments can surely be 
thought of as property rights, but for clarity the term is limited here to something that includes the 
right to exclude, as does ownership of real property, personal property, patents, or copyrights. This is 
not the place to explore the healthy literature on prizes versus patents.
 
The point is not that subsidies or 
other prizes are superior to property rights, for each has its drawbacks, but rather that they are an 
alternative. There is, for example, the difficulty of calculating the optimal subsidy, for the wrong 
subsidy can easily do worse than a patent or other property right. There is also the need to finance the 
subsidy. Subsidies, and prizes quite generally, can be linked to observed usage, so that the innovator is 
rewarded in proportion to the widespread use of, and likely utility associated with, the innovation. 
Payments can be designed and distributed ex ante, or calculated and awarded ex post, with innovators 
learning that they can rely on receiving rewards commensurate with the social value of their 
innovations. A prize might be in the form of “a million dollars for the development of a vaccine to 
immunize against flu strain x,” or it might be in the form of “the defense department promises to buy 
500,000 doses of a vaccine that protects against x.” It might be a promise or even expectation of 
employment. My claim is not that prizes are always superior, and indeed they are likely inferior when 
the prize giver cannot obtain information that would be useful for calibrating the prize. It is instead 
that prizes, broadly defined, are an alternative that it at least occasionally superior. It is likely that a 
mix of property rights and prizes is desirable. A different mix might be preferred where successful 
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innovation requires a breakthrough followed by substantial investment in distribution or 
“commercialization,” from that appropriate where there is only the need for a large capital investment.  
An iPrize Revolution would use familiar tools. For one thing, prizes have been discussed as 
replacements for patents in order to encourage lower-cost pharmaceuticals, and medical innovations 
more generally. It is apparent that the research and development costs associated with new drugs are 
substantial, and one well-known drawback of the patent system is that it leads to pricing that precludes 
the deployment of important drugs in developing countries. Moreover, the social benefit of some drugs 
is often regarded as greater than that signaled by market prices, while such things as cosmetic surgery 
and hair loss attract substantial attention from for-profit firms. Of course, governments and non-profit 
organizations are free to offer greater subsidies for outcomes they deem more socially beneficial. In 
the U.S., the Medical Innovation Prize Acts of 2005 and 2007 had little chance of enactment in 
Congress, but they reflected such sentiment. The Acts proposed to set aside funds, amounting to less 
than 1% of GDP, that would allow prizes to be substituted for patents, and that would encourage 
medical innovations.
4
 Proponents believed that a prize system on this scale could better the condition 
of patients, without harming the fisc or making innovators worse off. Critics argued for less ambitious 
and more incremental change. 
Prizes have at least as good a lineage as property rights. Columbus and other explorers of that age 
of exploration frequently invested much of their own wealth in their expeditions, and then received 
shares in the goods shipped home, as well as hereditary or lesser titles.
5
 It was much less common to 
receive a monopoly, or property right, in the form of land or to be rewarded with complete control 
over trade. In 1474, Venice enacted an early patent statute, the terms of which encouraged foreign 
innovators to migrate to Venice where their “contrivances” would be made known but also protected 
against imitation for ten years.
6
 One explanation, or rationalization, for the different strategies can also 
be applied to the Medical Innovation Prize Act, and it goes a long way toward explaining why interest 
groups have often pushed for property rights rather than prizes. If Venice had promised prizes to 
innovators, it would have needed not only to find a means of judging deserts but also a means of 
financing the promised payments. New taxes, earmarked for prizes, will impose deadweight losses. 
One could raise the income tax, though it is hardly an optimal tax, in order to avoid the monopolies 
associated with pharmaceutical patents. In practice, however, this adds administrative costs and brings 
about combat with interests that do not want to see their taxes raised. In contrast, Columbus and his 
cohorts were self-financing in the sense that their patrons could pay the stipulated prizes out of the 
new revenues generated by successful explorers. Present day copyright holders urge extended lives for 
their property rights as if they know that the losers have trouble self-identifying and organizing in 
opposition. 
Prizes should be understood to include ex ante grants as well as ex post rewards. This is especially 
appropriate when grants are based not only on research plans but also on the applicant’s history of 
success, as is the case for most government-financed grants in the sciences. American science, as well 
as literature and arts, is also significantly financed through employment, and access to facilities, at 
public and private universities and comparable institutions. Inasmuch as these are also government 
supported, the overall picture is one of prizes—in the broad sense of grants, prizes for 
                                                     
4
 Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2005, H.R. 417, 109th Cong. § 16 (2005); Medical Innovation Prize Act of 2007, S. 
2210, 110th Cong. § 15 (2007). 
5
 Samuel Eliot Morison, Admiral of the Ocean Sea: A Life of Christopher Columbus (1943) (describing norms with 
respect to titles and trade). 
6
 While Venice created the first comprehensive system of patent law, Ancient Greece gave patents (for one year) as early 
as 2500 years ago for confectioners or cooks who invented new dishes, and some 800 years later the Roman Empire 
exempted artisans of certain trades residing in cities from civil duties. For a discussion of the Venetian system and early 
patent grants, see Roman A Klitzke, Historical Background of the English Patent Law, J. Pat. Off. Soc’y 615, 617-620 
(1959).  
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accomplishments or for superior performance, tenured positions, and so forth—in addition to patents. 
It is easy to imagine that if the prize component increased, the patent (and copyright), or property 
right, component could decrease. It could do so proportionally, by a legislative change accompanied 
by a variety of transition rules, and even by contract, in the sense that grants might be distributed only 
to recipients who turned over their extant property rights to the government or other grantor.  
B. The Timing of the iPrize Revolution 
Four significant developments suggest the timing of the iPrize Revolution. The dominant one is the 
emergence of the idea economy. The reasoning here is fairly straightforward. Ideas are increasingly 
important, and manufactured goods less so. In turn, innovators are stymied by the idea-device 
distinction; if they want surer payments for ideas, they must either effect serious change in existing 
law or they must influence the political process in the direction of more prizes. Even in the absence of 
legal change, the relative growth of the idea sector means the relative growth in importance of prizes, 
because property rights are few and far between where mere ideas are concerned. One ready insight to 
be gleaned from this depiction of our changing economy and its legal apparatus is the growth of 
universities. Private and public universities specialize in ideas and rarely deal in manufactured goods. 
Some of these ideas are amenable to property right protection, of course, but it is apparent that grants 
and other prizes are much more important to university finances than income from copyrights and 
patents. 
A second reason to expect a shift toward prizes, writ large, is the growing evidence of patent 
thickets. The patent system is in something of a mess because of uncertainty about patents and the 
high transactions costs of negotiating with possible patent holders. Software companies and 
smartphone makers are, for instance, involved in numerous lawsuits with one another, where a given 
company is both challenging and defending a host of patents. An obvious means of escape from these 
thickets, is a move to subsidies and away from monopoly-property rights. Such a scheme might not 
require much change in law. If the shift comes about in a way that is financed by taxpayers, then it will 
be more difficult to assess whether this is something desirable.  
The third reason to expect the iPrize Revolution to be impending, focuses on copyrights rather than 
patents. As copying technology has improved, and the marginal cost of distribution descended toward 
zero, piracy has become a problem at the local and global levels. The low marginal cost also means 
that monopoly rights are less efficient because in theory we want to satisfy the demand of everyone 
who would pay more than marginal cost. It is apparent that a prize system could solve many problems 
at once. Creators of eligible works could be awarded prizes, not on the basis of the subjective view of 
some committee, for this raises fears of government intrusion, but rather on the basis of estimates of 
usage. The problem is funding; copyrights are self-financing even if inefficient, while prizes require a 
source of revenue. Small-scale systems meant to compensate for library borrowing in some countries 
or for audio recording in the U.S. (by taxing devices or audio tape) have not raised much revenue. On 
the other hand, the large number of persons who download music and other works might be willing 
and eager to force taxpayers at large to subsidize the creators and performers of the music they enjoy. 
If this group joins forces with the music industry, it is easy to imagine a legislated prize system 
emerging for music, books, movies, television programs, and possibly software. Again, this is a 
prediction about the coming iPrize Revolution, and not a claim that it is necessarily something to be 
desired. 
Finally, the pharmaceutical industry might spur the iPrize Revolution. It is an industry well known 
for the high costs of entry and product development, but then low marginal costs when it comes to 
producing most drugs. Politicians and various interest groups seem well aware of the efficiency, or 
problem, of selling a drug at a price above marginal cost but much below average cost (including 
development costs) and then having the pharmaceutical imported into other markets where it threaten 
to undo the innovator’s reward. The social costs and private problems with the property rights system 
A Public Choice View of IP(rizes) 
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are thus clear, so that a prize system of some sort would be well received. Occasionally, as with 
vaccines, governments intervene as large purchasers, but likely sales amount to just one kind of prize. 
It is easy to imagine that a large-scale prize system, political attention to price differentials among 
countries, or the unavailability of important drugs in developing countries will lead to a significant 
change in this industry in many jurisdictions. Politically potent pharmaceutical companies have not 
worked for such change because the opportunity for very high returns is greater with a property rights 
regime than with a prize system.  
C. The Dark Side of an iPrize Revolution 
A system of grants or other rewards is not necessarily something to be celebrated. Each of the triggers 
discussed in the previous section has an interest-group component, but it is also possible to imagine a 
large-scale political effort.
7
 Politicians and interest groups influence the budgetary process, and no 
government can be expected to fund research without making some political decisions about what to 
fund.  
In the normal course of politics, a large budget might be entrusted to a committee, with that body 
asked to award prizes to innovators based on the social good these innovators had created. But even 
this sort of system depends on financing, and interest groups will threaten this budgetary allocation 
with higher or lower funding levels depending on the prizes that are awarded. Nor will the problem be 
solved if the budget could somehow be insulated from politics, perhaps by being linked to a specified 
source of revenue; there will be pressure from innovators or industries that threaten to go out of 
business or to work on different projects unless they are well rewarded.  
III. iPrizes to Rescue Newspapers  
It is perhaps relatively easy to see how the development and supply of pharmaceuticals might be 
disentangled from property rights and instead made dependent on government grants, contracts, and 
other rewards. But this is a claim of possibility and not probability or necessity. For that, I turn to 
something with low marginal costs and a dysfunctional system of property rights. 
Our present idea economy incorporates and is fueled by information in digital form, and it is 
therefore an era in which some industries must reinvent themselves to accommodate new technologies 
with lower marginal costs than previously experienced. Consider, for example, the quintessential 
information-age business of news reporting, and the question of how newsgathering and intelligent 
news analysis will be financed. Many news organizations reflect elements of natural monopolies and, 
indeed, the industry as a whole comes close to a natural monopoly, as new readers or viewers can be 
accommodated at very low, if not zero, marginal cost. At present, relatively few publishers have 
switched to a model in which readers pay for online subscriptions, and advertising revenue has been 
reduced by competition from free online sites. Even before the digital age, newspapers needed some 
help from courts because “facts,” like ideas, do not generate copyright protection, so that freeriding is 
a problem where factfinding is expensive. The law responded to this issue by protecting time-sensitive 
news with a misappropriation doctrine just outside of copyright law. 
There are several ways for costly newsgathering and analysis to survive. An unlikely one is that 
reporting will be built around television stations, and this medium will continue to sell sufficient 
advertising to support the enterprise; online newspapers have not had analogous success with 
advertising revenues. Another is that newspapers will be transformed into websites that will attract 
                                                     
7
 The idea is that interest groups—perhaps as the result of the coordinating efforts of a political entrepreneur—will 
successfully push for prizes. They will exploit the fact that the costs will fall on dispersed and thus disorganized 
taxpayers. In contrast, when these groups push for expanded property rights they often confront identifiable opponents—
though there is no need for government revenue. 
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paying subscribers—assuming pirating and various freeriding problems can be solved.8 Copyright law 
and technological developments must, of course, prevent subscribers from simply passing on 
information to freeriders.
9
 But the third and most interesting possibility is that investigative reporters, 
like many scientists, will be motivated by prizes. “Reporters” might self-identify and simply generate 
stories on their own, or perhaps intermediaries will filter submissions by certifying reporters or their 
outputs. Either way, compensation can come from non-profit organizations or from the government 
itself. It is unlikely that these prizes or other payments could be determined by usage, in a manner 
suggested by the regulation of electric utilities, because costs are not proportional to use. Similarly, if 
subsidies for news sources were determined by popular vote, a source that reported Hollywood gossip 
would garner more support than one that took the trouble of traveling to war zones at considerable 
expense. Finally, it is apparent that outright government support for news organizations or for 
individual reporters runs the risk of biasing the information the citizenry receives.  
A reader who has been patient with the argument to this point will note the irony of the imagined 
evolutionary step. When a future observer looks back on the evolutionary path, that observer will be in 
a position to note an optimistic and a skeptical story. The optimistic one will be that prizes and other 
subsidies emerged, and took the place of conventional property rights, as the commons proved more 
fertile than tragic. The skeptical one will be that interest groups preferred prizes—as digital 
technology made monopoly property rights more difficult to exploit—and sought an increasing share 
of tax revenues from a dispersed public. The government went along with this suggestion, it might be 
said, because it was able to reward its friends and starve its detractors.  
The prospect of extensive prizes for news reporting would seem less startling if legal systems had 
more experience with prizes for other copyrightable material, including books. Several legal systems 
have legislated modest prizes, or ex post rewards, for authors on the basis of readership estimates, and 
perhaps this model will become more important as electronic books come to dominate the market.
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The logic of these prizes, or distribution of tax revenues, has been that publicly supported libraries 
sometimes weaken an author’s “right” of distribution. It should be emphasized that the discussion has 
now expanded from prizes for ideas to prizes as a substitute and supplement for intellectual property 
rights more generally. News-gatherers, novelists, and inventors have in common the low marginal cost 
associated with incremental users. They come together in a discussion of intellectual property rights in 
the idea economy not because of any change in the idea/device or expression/facts ratio, but because 
the development of technologies that reduce the distribution costs of expressions and facts have made 
newspapers resemble many scientific discoveries in terms of cost structure. 
                                                     
8
 It may turn out that technological changes will mitigate the current unwillingness of customers to assent to paywalls, and 
news will be delivered to subscribers through applications on mobile devices, for example.  See Wikipedia Founder Says 
Apps, Not Paywalls, Could Save The News, Samuel Axon, September 4, 2010, online at 
http://mashable.com/2010/09/04/jimmy-wales-apps-news/ (suggesting that sales through mobile applications may obviate 
the need for conventional online paywalls); Mac App Store Launches With Thousand Apps, Big Discounts, Charlie Sorrel, 
January 6, 2011, online at http://www.wired.com/gadgetlab/2011/01/mac-app-store-launches-with-1000-apps-
big-discounts/ (describing intermediary’s strategy for selling news). 
9
 Note an important difference between the music and the news industries. Even as musicians and composers lose revenue 
because of (sometimes unlawful) downloading, live performances remain an important source of revenue. Pirating may 
even increase this revenue. News producers lack a comparable source of income. 
10
 See Ernest Seemann, A Look at the Public Lending Right, 30 Copyright L. Symp. (ASCAP) 71 (1983).  The “public 
lending right” was introduced in the United Kingdom in 1979 and comes in different varieties elsewhere. It has been 
encouraged by a 1992 European Union directive. See also S.2192, 98th Cong., 1st Sess., preamble, § 4(c)(ii) (1983). 
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Conclusion 
The stage is set for an iPrize Revolution. All interest groups will like to be on the receiving end of 
prizes and property rights, but many will also prefer prizes over property rights, especially in 
industries where the digital age or global competition has made the property rights system 
dysfunctional. Indeed, I have suggested that private parties might on their own design prize systems to 
replace property rights. I have not insisted that this revolution is necessarily good or bad, just that it 
will involve significantly more interest-group activity.  
Saul Levmore 
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